What Shelter Remains for Builder/Vendors
Under Washington's Statute of Repose for
Construction After Pfeifer v.
Bellingham'?
Those who make improvements to real property occupy a
working environment that provides a variety of unique situations. They design, assemble, and adapt raw materials in
varied settings. Each finished product is an amalgam of past
practice and experiment. Although they must use a standard
of care based on experience, each improvement includes novel
and untested aspects. This process can create long-term and
unforeseeable risks. The legislature determined that those
who make improvements to real property should not be liable
in tort within the discovery rule as it is applied generally and
enacted a statute of repose that places a six-year limit
on the
2
rule for claims arising out of the construction process.
1. 112 Wash. 2d 562, 772 P.2d 1018 (1989).
2. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.300 provides in part:
RCW 4.16.300 through 4.16.320 shall apply to all claims or causes of action of any
kind against any person, arising from such person having constructed, altered or
repaired any improvement upon real property, or having performed or furnished any
design, planning, surveying, architectural or construction or engineering services, or
supervision or observation of construction, or administration of construction contracts
for any construction, alteration or repair of any improvement upon real property. This
section is intended to benefit only those persons referenced herein and shall not apply
to claim or causes of action against manufacturers....
WASH. REv. CODE § 4.16.310 provides in part:
All claims or causes of action as set forth in RCW 4.16.300 shall accrue,
and the applicable statute of limitation shall begin to run only during the
period within six years after substantial completion of construction, or during
the period within six years after the termination of the services enumerated
in RCW 4.16.300, whichever is later. The phrase "substantial completion of
construction" shall mean the state of completion reached when an improvement upon real property may be used or occupied for its intended use. Any
cause of action which has not accrued within six years after such substantial
completion of construction, or within six years after such termination of services, whichever is later, shall be barred. Provided, That this limitation shall
not be asserted as a defense by any owner, tenant or other person in possession and control of the improvement at the time such cause of action accrues.
The limitations prescribed in this section apply to all claims or causes of
action as set forth in RCW 4.16.300 brought in the name or for the benefit of
the state which are made or commenced after June 11, 1986....
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.320 provides:
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The discovery rule protects injured plaintiffs when the
negligent acts of others are not discovered until the harm
occurs, 3 which can be a substantial time after the original tor-

tious act. If not for the discovery rule, the statute of limitations would commence at the time of the tortious act and
expire long before the injury actually occurs. The rule simply
shifts the onset of the statute of limitations from the date of
the tortious act to the date of the harm's discovery.
This protection is appropriate in situations where the
intervening acts of others do not affect the original act, or
where the original harm is easily proven and foreseen. However, in the case of improvements to real property, the longer
the improvement has been out of the control of its creator, it
becomes more likely that the cause of the damage was the
present owner's fault or the fault of natural forces. As a
result, the original risk grows much more difficult to assess
and allegations of fault more difficult to defend.
Statutes of repose are a legislative solution to the effect of
the discovery rule on potentially long-term liability. In contrast to statutes of limitation, which begin to operate when the
harm arises, statutes of repose commence operation at a neutral point in time and cut off the plaintiff's right to sue for
harm that occurs after a specified period of time has passed.
They create a window of insurable risk of definite duration in
which a potential defendant is exposed to the threat of liability. As applied to real property improvements, statutes of
repose promote the social policy of encouraging such improvements by lowering insurance costs to builders.4
In Washington, Wash. Rev. Code §§ 4.16.300-.320 impose a
six-year limitation period on the accrual of causes of action
that arise from making improvements to real property.' The
statute operates by establishing a six-year time limit after the
improvement is substantially completed6 within which the
cause of action must arise. If damage occurs after this time
Nothing in RCW 4.16.300 through 4.16.320 shall be construed as extending
the period now permitted by law for bringing any kind of action.
3. See, e.g., U.S. Oil & Refining Co. v. Dep't of Ecology, 96 Wash. 2d 85, 633 P.2d
1329 (1981).
4. See Note, Building Limitation Statutes (RCW 4.16.160, 4.16.300, 4.16310), 23:1
Wai-AmrrE L. REv. 314, 318 (1987).
5. See supra note 1.
6. "The phrase 'substantial completion of construction' shall mean the state of
completion reached when an improvement upon real property may be used or
occupied for its intended use." WASH. REv. CODE § 4.16.310.
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limit has passed, regardless of the cause, any action is barred
by operation of law.
Pfeifer v. Bellingham7 is the latest in a series of Washington State cases to analyze and apply Wash. Rev. Code
§§ 4.16.300-.320. The case involves a novel and successful
attempt to circumvent the operation of the statute. The Pfeifer decision removes the protection of the statute from builders who purchase unimproved property and build "spec"
houses' for subsequent sale. Clearly, claims brought against
these builders couched in terms negligence and falling outside
the statute's window period are barred by the statute of repose.
The Pfeifer decision, however, allows such plaintiffs to recast
claims as misrepresentation claims against builders as vendors
of land under § 353 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts for
failure to disclose dangerous concealed defects to their vendees.' Now, the builder's posture as a vendor leaves him potentially open to attack for an indefinite period of time under a
tort theory developed specifically for an entirely different
group of defendants-those who transfer possessory interests
in land. Holding that the Restatement theory should be
applied to builders as well as other vendors of real property,
the Pfeifer court reversed a summary judgment in favor of a
builder-defendant and remanded the case for trial on its
facts.10
In reaching its holding, the court faced an apparent conflict between the statute of repose which protects builders and
the Restatement theory which does not, and determined that
one need not preempt the other. The court held that the two
rules do not conflict." The court's reasoning suggests that
exempting vendors from § 353 because they happened to have
built the improvement would be unfair.'2
Asserting that
7. 112 Wash. 2d 562, 772 P.2d 1018 (1989).
8. "Spec" or speculation: A "spec" house is financed by the builder in the hope of
finding a buyer at some future time; it is distinguished from "custom" construction, in
which the future homeowner finances the construction. Justice Durham notes that
"custom" builders also frequently retain a property interest to facilitate the

homeowner's financing. 112 Wash. 2d at 572, 772 P.2d at 1023-24 (Durham, J.,
dissenting).
9. See i f ur note 33 for text of § 353.
10. 112 Wash. 2d at 571, 772 P.2d at 1023.
11. Id. at 570, 772 P.2d 1023. The court held quite simply that when the cause of
action arises from the sale of land, the statute is inapplicable. Id.
12. "A seller who also happens to be a builder should not be shielded from
liability ....
If builders also engage in the activity of selling, they should face the
liability of sellers." Pfeifer, 112 Wash. 2d at 568, 772 P.2d at 1022.
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greater proof is required for § 353 actions than for negligence
claims, the court claimed that its holding did not defeat the
purpose of the Statute of Repose.' 3 The court's attempt to synchronize the rules, however, left their underlying policies in
hopeless conflict. In so doing, the court has opened the door to
suits that the statute of repose was intended to prevent. In
suits couched in terms of misrepresentation, the holding leaves
unresolved the conflict between the Restatement theory as it
applies to builder/vendors and the statute of repose which
seemingly protects the builder persona of the defendant.
While the statute of repose protects a builder who intentionally creates a dangerous condition, the Restatement theory
imposes liability on one who passively fails to disclose a dangerous condition to his buyer.
In a Pfeifer scenario the rules cannot be synchronized
because the policies behind them are directly opposed. The
statute of repose operates to foreclose liability in order to protect defendants and encourage the activity of construction. By
contrast, the Restatement theory extends liability to protect
plaintiffs by allowing suits that previously had been barred by
the principle of caveat emptor and the requirement of privity.
During the six-year window of the statute of repose, one who
makes improvements to real property is exposed to all liability,
including that imposed by § 353. The Pfeifer decision allows
§ 353 liability to continue indefinitely, even after the statute of
repose closes the window of liability on negligence claims.
Section 353 was not created as a substitute for claims timebarred by legislative mandate; moreover, it is awkward to
apply where the gravamen of the complaint is an action rather
than a failure to act. In addition, since the exposure to liability
for stale claims which vendors of real property face in § 353
actions is similar to the exposure from which builders of
improvements are protected by Wash. Rev. Code §§ 4.16.300.320, a policy that encourages transfers of real property may be
as valuable as the policy encouraging construction of improvements thereon. Thus, when faced with the choice of curtailing
liability to vendors or increasing it to builders, the court should
have opted to limit liability to vendors to conform to legislative
intent.
This Note criticizes Pfeifer's incomplete resolution of the
apparent conflict between Wash. Rev. Code §§ 4.16.300-.320 and
13. Id. at 570, 772 P.2d at 1023.
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§ 353 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and calls for a
reconsideration of the case. The Note is premised on the general validity of statutes of repose and the merit of the policies
that they promote.'4 The Note first reviews briefly the development of statutes of repose generally, how they operate, and
how courts in Washington and in other jurisdictions have
applied them. It then analyzes the development of the
Restatement's § 353 and its policy. Next, it examines the Pfeifer court's resolution of the rules conflict, its rationale, and the
possible effects of applying the Pfeifer holding to the building
industry.
This Note asserts that the Washington Supreme Court
could have resolved Pfeifer's issues in a manner more consistent with the purpose of the statute. It suggests that the statute be reworded to include expressly the sale of an
improvement, or, alternatively, that the court or legislature
place a six-year limit on causes of action for injuries arising
from the transfer of land. This Note proposes that courts
addressing this issue rule that § 353 claims be dismissed when
they accrue six years after the transfer of the improvement, at
least in those cases in which construction liability against the
builder of the concealed condition would be barred under the
statute of repose.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATUTE

At common law, privity of contract was required to impose
liability in tort for damages arising under a contract."5 In the
1842 case of Winterbottom v. Wright,16 the defendant's nonperformance of a contract resulted in physical injury to a
stranger to the contract. Although the court was sympathetic
to the need for a remedy, it held that no matter how dire the
need might be, any relaxation of the strict privity standard
14. The validity of these statutes has been examined adequately elsewhere. See
generally Notes and Comments, intra notes 18, 26, 30; see also Comment, Design for
Challenge: The Kentucky Statute of Repose for Improvements to Real Property, 73 KY.
L.J. 1143 (1984-85); Heller, The Districtof Columbia'sArchitects' and Builders' Statute
of Repose: Its Application and Need for Amendment, 34 CATH. U. L. REv. 919 (1985);
Note, Daugaard v. Baltic Cooperative Building Supply Association: Statutes of
Limitation Held Unconstitutional,30 S.D. L. REv. 157 (1984); Note, The Decline and
Rise of Statutes of Repose-Witherspoon v. Sides Construction Co., 19 CREIGHTON L.
REv. 509 (1985-86); Volk, Statutes of Repose for Improvements to Real Property: Equal
Protection Considerations,22 Am. Bus. L. J. 343 (1984).
15. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF ToRTS § 93, at 667 (5th ed. 1984).
16. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exchequer of Pleas, 1842).
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would create an endless chain of liability for the original parties to the contract. Baron Rolfe warned: "Hard cases, it has
been frequently observed, are apt to introduce bad law."' 7
Thus, the common law limited the liability of architects, builders, and others who make improvements to real property to
the original parties to the contract.'8
The privity limitation met its demise in the 1916 case of
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company.19 The holding relaxed
the Winterbottom standard and imposed liability on manufacturers to any foreseeable user of a negligently-made chattel
that was "reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril."'
The MacPherson decision became a benchmark in the development of consumer protection law. Since the McPherson decision, courts have expanded on its holding to include ever more
distant links in the manufacturing and distribution chain while
the standard of care has evolved toward strict liability.2 ' As
this sphere of liability spread, it reached eventually those who
make improvements to real property, particularly architects
for negligent design and builders for negligent construction.'
This expanded pool of foreseeable plaintiffs could include
anyone who would subsequently own, rent, or visit the
improvement. And, because the life of an improvement to real
property is long, architects and builders developed a perilous
exposure to actions for negligence. An architect or a builder
facing an otherwise stale claim might find it more expedient,
or perhaps, necessary, to settle the claim rather than to
attempt a difficult defense in court, where the plaintiff's injuries are recent and the proof of standard of care must be
argued on a stage set and dismantled long ago.
Architects' and builders' associations reacted to the
increase in their exposure to liability by lobbying their legislatures for protection. 3 They argued that the nature of their
work prevented them from self-protection against stale claims
17. Id. at 116, 152 Eng. Rep. at 406.
18. See Comment, Limitation of Action Statutes for Architects and BuildersBlueprintsfor Non-action, 18 CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 362 (1969).

19. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
20. Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
21. See W. PROSSEP, supra note 15, at 668.
22. The application of the MacPhersonrule to architects and builders is generally
traced to Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority, 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164
N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957). The Inman court quoted MacPherson and found no difference
between dangerous chattels and dangerous improvements to real property.
23. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 18, at 366 n.35; Hearingson H.R 6527, H.R 6678
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and the negligence of others.' Responsive state legislatures
enacted statutes of repose for architects and builders. Washington enacted its original statute in 1967.' As of 1986, fortysix states had enacted similar statutes.2 6 The statutes vary in
length of time in which they allow an action to accrue and in
the language describing the activities subject to them.'" They
are all substantially the same in that, at some specified time
subsequent to the completion of the project, they cut off a
cause of action against persons who make improvements to
real property.' Needless to say, these statutes quickly became
unpopular with plaintiff's bars. In the twenty-odd years since
their enactment, different aspects of the statute have been
tested in many jurisdictions under a variety of legal theories.'
Attempts to circumvent the action of the statute fall into
three major areas: attacks on its constitutionality,3° arguments
and HK 11544 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on the District of
Columbia, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 34 (1967).
24. See Comment, supra note 18, at 379-84, discussing the parallel liability of
manufacturers, physicians, and attorneys. In Washington, physicians' liability is
covered under WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.350; manufacturers' liability is covered under
WASH. REv. CODE § 7.72.060.

25. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.16.300-.320, enacted by Laws 1967, ch. 75, §§ 1-3.
26. See Comment, Oklahoma's Statute of Repose Limiting the Liability of
Architects and Engineersfor Negligence: A PotentialNightmare, 22 TuiSA L. J. 85, 8889 n.26 (1986).
27. Id.
28. See id. at 89.
29. See J. ACRET, ARcHrrEcT
& ENGINEERS, § 11.07 (2nd ed. 1984).
30. See Note, Shibuya v. Architects Hawaii, Ltd.: Did the Court Apply an
IntermediateStandard ofReview?, 6 U. HAW. L. REV. 261, 262 (1984). Hawaii's statute
has been rewritten four times.
The constitutionality of the statute of repose has been attacked because it bars a
plaintiff's cause of action before it occurs, while protecting a special favored class. Id.
Commentators have argued that barring an unrealized cause of action violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
of various state constitutions. See Rogers, The Constitutionalityof Alabama's Statute
of Limitations for Construction Litigation: The Legislature Tries Again, 11 Cum. L
Rev. 1 (1980).
The first state to find its statute of repose unconstitutional was Illinois. In
Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill.
2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967), the Illinois Supreme Court
struck down the statute because it protected the special classes of architects and
contractors. The Washington statute has survived its constitutional attack. In Yakima
Fruit & Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heating & Plumbing Co., 81 Wash. 2d 528, 503
P.2d 108 (1972), the Washington Supreme Court distinguished the Skinner decision on
the basis that the Washington statute, which protects "any person" making an
improvement to real property, differs from the Illinois statute, which protects only
particular vocations. 81 Wash. 2d at 532, 108 P.2d at 111. The statutes have been
scrutinized in most jurisdictions, with the majority of jurisdiction upholding them.
Rogers, supra at 17. Cases upholding the statutes are discussed thoroughly in many
critical law review articles. See supra note 14.
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that a particular action is not barred by the statute because the
time limit has not elapsed,"' and arguments that a particular
action is not barred by the statute of limitations because the
harm was not caused by an improvement to real property.3 2
Statutes of repose encourage the socially desirable goal of
improving real property by protecting from liability those persons who make such improvements. Courts have recognized
that these statutes have a dual rationale for eliminating stale
claims. These protections apply to injuries that occur long
after their involvement in the improvement has ended
(1) when allegations would be difficult to defend, and (2) when
the damage is likely due to the actions of others. Despite this
straightforward message from the legislature, courts sympathetic to plaintiffs continue to poke holes in these statutes.
The Pfeifer court is no exception.

II. DEVELOPMENT OF § 353
Liability in Pfeifer is based on failure to disclose a latent
dangerous condition under § 353 of the Restatement (Second)
31. In the second general area of attack on the statutes, plaintiffs attempt to
deflect the bar of the statute by distinguishing the work done from "substantial
completion." See, e-g., Glacier Springs Property Owners v. Glacier Springs Enterprises,
41 Wash. App. 829, 706 P.2d 652 (1985), review denied, 105 Wash. 2d 1002 (1985) (water
system, although installed and in operation, found not substantially complete until
installation of water storage tank by second contractor ten months later). Differing
formulas for determining the commencement of the bar have developed in various
jurisdictions. See A. LEVY, SOLVING STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PROBLEMS (1987). In
Washington, the cause of action must accrue within six years of the substantial
completion of the improvement. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.310, see supra note 2. At the
time of discovery, the pertinent statute of limitation for the particular cause of action
begins to run. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.320. Thus, an action for negligence that accrues
close to six years after the substantial completion of the improvement may be brought
up to three years later. Id. This means that the builder is liable for harm up to nine
years after substantial completion of the improvement. See Hudesman v. Meriwether
Leachman Assoc., 35 Wash. App. 318, 323, 666 P.2d 937, 940-41 (1983).
32. Most cases in which defendants raise the statute as a bar attempt to exclude
the cause of the harm from the definition of the statute on the basis of an ambiguity.
As an example, the Washington statute specifically excludes "manufacturers." As a
result, these potential ambiguities become arguable issues. See e.g., Condit v. Lewis
Refrigeration Co., 101 Wash. 2d 106, 676 P.2d 466 (1984) (manufacturer of heavy
equipment for use within building not intended to be protected by statute of repose);
Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heating & Plumbing Co., 81 Wash. 2d 528,
503 P.2d 108 (1972) (refrigerating plant installed in building is realty, not personality);
Morse v. Toppenish, 46 Wash. App. 60, 729 P.2d 638 (1986) (swimming pool is
improvement, diving board is not); Pinneo v. Stevens Pass, Inc., 14 Wash. App. 848, 545
P.2d 1207 (1976) (a ski lift improves value of property, is permanent in nature, and is
classified as improvement to real property).
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of Torts.'e Section 353 was developed as an exception to the
rule of caveat emptor, which had immunized vendors from
liablity for physical harm caused by dangerous conditions
existing at the time of transfer of possession.' Because § 353
was developed simply to impose a duty to warn, its standard
for concealment is much broader than the standard for fraud
and it intentionally overlaps the boundaries of negligence.
The duty imposed in a negligence action usually depends
upon what the actor "knew or should have known" under the
facts of the case. The § 353 standard for concealment, however, is what the vendor actually "knew or had reason to
know."'
Significantly, the terms "should have known" and
"had reason to know" are not synonymous. Section 12 of the
Restatement points out that the former imposes a duty upon
the actor to ascertain the fact in question, while the latter
implies that a reasonable person could infer the existence of
the fact in question from facts already known.3 6 Thus, because
he should have known of the risk, a builder might be negligent
for using floor joists that are too flimsy to support a normal
load. However, he can be culpable as a seller for failure to disclose this defect only if he actually knows, or has reason to
know, that the floor joists are dangerous. In this sense, the
proof required to demonstrate knowledge may be greater for
knowing concealment than for negligence, as the Pfeifer court
claims. However, in application, the difference may be moot.
Reasonable minds might disagree whether the hapless
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS (1965):
§ 353. Undisclosed Dangerous Conditions Known to Vendor

(1) A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any
condition, whether natural or artificial, which involves unreasonable risk to
persons on the land, is subject to liability to the vendee and others upon the
land with the consent of the vendee or his subvendee for physical harm

caused by the condition after the vendee has taken possession, if
(a) the vendee does not know or have reason to know of the condition or
the risk involved, and
(b) the vendor knows or has reason to know of the condition, and
realizes or should realize the risk involved, and has reason to believe that the
vendee will not discover the condition or realize the risk.
(2) If the vendor actively conceals the condition, the liability stated in
subsection (1) continues until the vendee discovers it and has reasonable
opportunity to take effective precautions against it. Otherwise the liability
continues only until the vendee has had reasonable opportunity to discover
the condition and to take such precautions.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 352, comment a (1965).

35. Id. § 353 (1965), see supra note 33.
36. Id. § 12, comment a (1965).
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floor-builder knew or merely should have known of the risk, a
distinction that would be irrelevant in a determination of his
negligence. The determination of whether the floor-builder
should have realized the danger turns on whether a reasonable
person would infer the danger. The outcome of this determination will likely depend upon the standard of knowledge
imputed to the actor, naturally higher for a professional floorbuilder than, for instance, for the writer of this Note.
What a floor-builder can (or should be able to) infer about
his work depends upon his level of knowledge. Although the
distinction between what a floor-builder can infer and what he
should be able to infer is irrelevant for a finding of negligence,
if the point is argued, the trier of fact might find that a negligent floor-builder had knowledge of his negligence. The point
is easy to allege, and when the builder is also the vendor, the
point becomes worth arguing if the floor collapses more than
six years after completion of the structure. Potentially, when
the vendor and the builder are the same person, the vendor
could have reason to know what the builder should have
known.
Section 353 was developed originally to create a cause of
action for vendees, who were prevented from suing by the doctrine of caveat emptor, and for remote parties, who were prevented from suing by privity requirements . 7 A § 353 cause of
action differs from a negligence cause of action because it
requires actual knowledge of an operative fact: However, it is
similar to a negligence claim because ultimate knowledge
based upon the operative fact need only be inferred.' Further,
the vendor may be held liable even if he does not actually realize the risk.' Although § 353 embraces intentional misrepresentation, its standard for scienter is broader, including implied
misrepresentation 4' and possibly negligent failure to disclose. 4 '
The Tentative Draft to the 1965 Restatement lists cases that
use "reason to know" and "should have known" interchangeably.' The comments refer to the exercise of "reasonable care
37. See supra note 33.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 353, comment c (1965).

39. The Restatement provides that such liability may be imposed if the vendor.
"realizes or should realize the risk involved." Id. at § 353(1)(b).
40. See Id. § 354, comment b (1965).
41. A lessor must exercise "reasonable care" to disclose defects. See id. § 358,
comment c (1965).
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 358, p. 129, comment b (Tent. Draft No. 5,
April 8, 1960).
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to disclose."'43
Finally, while § 353 imposes a duty to disclose, the Institute left within the courts the discretion to resolve the issue of
44
how long this duty should continue on a case-by-case basis.
The Institute recognized that the duty should not continue
after the vendee has had sufficient time to discover the danger
himself. Thus, the Institute faced the same question that the
legislature resolved when it created the statute of repose. The
Institute, however, decided not to decide this question but
determined that the duty should continue for a reasonable but
indefinite period of time.
A reasonable but indefinite length of time is a determination made traditionally by the trier of fact. The uncertainty of
the determination depends, not only upon the facts of the case,
but upon the relative skills of the adversaries and the sympathies of the jury. The legislature intentionally foreclosed this
risk to builders at six years by enacting the statute of repose.
In Pfeifer,the court has reestablished this risk for builder/vendors by allowing the trier of fact to determine the period in
which the builder/vendor should remain subject to liability.
III.

THE PFEIFER SOLUTION: A NOVEL CHOICE
OF RULES ATTACK

On June 2, 1986, a fire broke out in one of the units of the
Willowwood Condominiums in Bellingham, Washington.4 5
Because the fire blocked the only exit from the building, Holly
Pfeifer had to jump from her window to escape. As a lessee,
Ms. Pfeifer could not sue the builder/vendor of the condominIt is not necessary that the lessor have actual knowledge of the condition,
if he has reason to know of it. Bohen Bros. v. Krumbein, (1922) 28 Ga. App.
788, 113 S.E. 58 ("reasonable notice"); Cutter v. Hamlen, (1888) 147 Mass. 471,
18 N.E. 397 ("should have known"); Rhoades v. Seidel, (1905) 139 Mich. 608,
102 N.W. 1025 ("ought to have known"); Taylor v. First Nat. Bank, (1912) 119
Minn. 525, 138 N.W. 783 ("should have known"); Meade v. Montrose, (1913)
175 Mo. App. 722, 160 S.E. 11 ("adequate reason to suspect"); Charlton v.
Brunelle, (1925) 82 N.H. 100, 130 A. 216 ("suspicion"); Idel v. Mitchell, (1899)
158 N.Y. 134, 52 N.E. 740 ("should have known"); Cesar v. Karutz, (1875) 60
N.Y. 229, 19 Am. Rep. 438 ("adequate reason to suspect"); Cohen v. Cotheal
(1913) 156 App. Div. 784, 142 N.Y.S. 90, affirmed (1915) 215 N.Y. 659, 109 N.E.
1070 ("constructive notice").
43. "Reason to know" and "should realize" were added to §§ 353 and 358 in the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 353, page 124 (Tent.
Draft No. 5).
44. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS, p. viii (Tent. Draft No. 5).
45. 112 Wash. 2d 562, 564, 772 P.2d 1018, 1020 (1989).
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ium for breach of contract. Thus, for her physical and emotional damages, she sued, among others, the builders of the
condominium, in tort. Based on a theory of negligent construction, Mrs. Pfeifer originally argued that the builder's failure to
provide adequate fire exits, fire-stops, and two hour fire walls
proximately caused her injuries. 46
Although the building had been completed in 1979, Ms.
Pfeifer's negligence complaint would have been timely under
the three-year statute of limitations for negligence 4 7 because
Washington's discovery rule provides that a cause of action
accrues when the harm is discovered.' However, because the
building had been completed and sold in 1979, her suit was
barred by Washington's statute of repose, which forecloses any
action that arises more than six years after substantial completion of an improvement to real property against the person
who made the improvement.4 9
Because the statute barred her claim for negligence, Ms.
Pfeifer amended her complaint against Island Construction by
stating a cause of action under § 353 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts alleging "negligent and intentional concealment
of a dangerous condition"' by a seller of real property. 51 Ms.
Pfeifer contended that Island Construction knowingly altered
plans that the architect had presented for pre-approval to the
Bellingham Building Department.
The altered plans
recharacterized the building as a two-story building with a
daylight basement rather than a three-story building by making changes in the surrounding grade.5 2 This regrading of the
land around the building reduced the distance from the top
story to the ground. A two-story building requires only one
fire exit and fewer structural fire protection designs, thus
greatly reducing construction costs.' Ms. Pfeifer contended
that the dangerous conditions were known to Island Construction.' Island Construction responded by claiming that the
46. Id.
47. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.080 (2).
48. See, e.g., U.S. Oil and Refining v. Dep't of Ecology, 96 Wash. 2d 85, 633 P.2d
1329 (1981).
49. See supra note 2.
50. Pfeifer, 112 Wash. 2d at 564, 772 P.2d at 1020.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Brief for Appellant, p. 21, Pfeifer, 112 Wash. 2d 562, 772 P.2d 1018.
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building was in fact a two-story structure with a basement.5

3-story bldg.

2-story bldg.

Willowwood
Condominium

The Pfeifer court found precedent in Washington for the
Restatement theory.' Because Island Construction built and
sold the units of the condominium, the court framed the issue
as whether Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.300-.320 bars an action
against a seller of an improvement, who is also the builder,
when the plaintiff is personally injured.5 7 The court held that
it did not.'
Applying a novel approach to statutory
construction, the court distinguished the act of selling the
completed improvement from the act of building it.
Consequently, the court exposed a substantial portion of the
building industry to liability for activities previously
considered to be within the protection of the statute of
repose.5 9
A majority of the Pfeifer court looked at the statute and
found no clear legislative intent to protect vendors simply
because they had also built the improvements.' The majority
determined that it would be unfair to protect the sub-group of
vendors who were involved in the construction of the
improvement solely on the basis of that involvement, while all
55. Pfeifer, 112 Wash. 2d at 564, 772 P.2d at 1019.

56. Id. at 565, 772 P.2d at 1020 (citing Wilson v. Thermal Energy, Inc., 21 Wash.
App. 153, 155, 583 P.2d 679 (1978)) (plaintiff slipped and involuntarily thrust his arm
through a glass door); Obde v. Schlemeyer, 56 Wash. 2d 449, 353 P.2d 672 (1960).
57. Pfeifer, 112 Wash. 2d at 565, 772 P.2d at 1020.

58. Id. at 563, 772 P.2d at 1019.
59. "In virtually 100% of "spec" construction and approximately 50% of custom
construction, the builder owns the property during the construction phase." Id. at 572,
772 P.2d at 1023-24 (Durham, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 570, 772 P.2d at 1022.

196

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 14:183

other vendors would remain liable under § 353.61 By contrast,
the Pfeifer dissent found that the statute plainly protected all
builders, including those who also sold the improvements.6
The majority stated that its holding still precluded suits
against builders for negligence because the proof required
under § 353 is greater than that for mere negligence.' The
dissent claimed that the majority's opinion effectively repealed
the statute.64
The unfairness that the majority feared would accrue to a
special class of vendors if allowed to invoke the statute on the
basis of involvement in the construction of the improvement
can only occur when the vendor is substantially involved in the
construction. The majority justified its holding on the basis
that builders remain sufficiently protected because the proof
required under § 353 is greater than that required for
negligence. Such a justification, however, is irrelevant to the
analysis that the court should have undertaken. The statute of
repose bars all causes of action, regardless of the level of proof.
Further, a § 353 cause of action can be framed solely on a
negligence standard in some cases because the duty to disclose
is grounded on reasonableness, not scienter.
On the other hand, the dissent may have gone too far in
the other direction by incorrectly predicting the demise of the
statute. Whether the holding will affect others involved in the
construction of the improvement, such as architects, engineers,
and subcontractors, is at this point unclear. However, the
decision suggests that the court will entertain other theories of
misrepresentation. A strict reading of the holding would limit
liability to builders who transfer interests in the property.
However, an expansive interpretation might allow the
entertainment of other theories of misrepresentation as well.
The Pfeier application of § 353 is a departure from
traditional judicial construction of the statute of repose. The
court based its rationale for limiting the reach of the statute in
order to apply § 353 on a minor point derived from the New
Mexico case Howell v. Burk.66 By isolating sale of the
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
N.M. 3,

Id.
Id. at 571-75, 772 P.2d at 1023-25 (Durham, J., dissenting).
Id. at 570, 772 P.2d at 1023.
Id. at 571-72, 772 P.2d at 1023 (Durham, J., dissenting).
See cases cited supra note 42.
90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214 (Ct. App.), cert denied, Albuquerque v. Howell, 91
569 P.2d 413 (1977). The case is discussed infira at notes 65-73.
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improvement and removing it from the cloak of the statute,
the Pfeifer holding creates a new area of attack upon a
substantial pool of builders involved in the financing of
improvements. This attack is then realized with the
broadsword of § 353.
A.

The Point of the Sword: The "activityanalysis" of
Howell v. Burk

In order to help get a handle on the overlapping areas of
concern in its own statute of repose, 7 the Court of Appeals of
New Mexico developed the "activity analysis," which predicates liability on the basis of the activity in which the actor
engages." In Howell v. Burk, which was cited by and applied
by the Pfeifer court, the plaintiff collided with a glass door on
an airport observation deck. The collision occured outside of
the window period of the New Mexico statute of repose. The
plaintiff sued the owner, the contractor, the architect, and the
firm that designed, manufactured, sold, and installed the glass.
The Howell court easily found that the statute protected the
architect and the contractor but not the owner of the improvement. The court created the "activity analysis" to disentangle
the potential liabilities of the firm for its multiple roles as the
69
designer, manufacturer, vendor and installer of the glass.
The firm argued that it should be completely protected
because it was part of the "construction team."70 In response,
the court quoted language from the New Mexico statute stating specifically that liability would not adhere to persons
involved in making improvements upon real property "on
account of such activity."' 7 ' The court found that the statutory
language thus required an "activity analysis". 7 2 The court
held that the statute protected the firm to the extent that it
designed and installed the glass. 73 However, because the activities of manufacturing and selling were not listed in the New
67. § 37-1-27 N.M. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1978), formerly § 23-1-26 N.M. STAT. ANN.
(Supp. 1975).
68. Howell v. Burk, 90 N.M. 688, 697, 568 P.2d 214, 223 (Ct. App.) cert denied,
Albuquerque v. Howell, 91 N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413 (1977). The Howell decision offers an
encyclopedia of theories used to escape the bar of the statute.

69. Id. at 697, 568 P.2d at 223.
70. Id.
71. Id (emphasis in original).
72. Id. This language is absent from the Washington statute, suggesting that it
should have a broader protective reach. See supra note 2.
73. Howell, 90 N.M. at 697, 568 P.2d at 223.
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Mexico statute, the firm would not be protected to the extent
that it was sued in those capacities.7 4
As far as the Howell "activity analysis" distinguished the
activity of manufacturing from that of designing and installing
the glass, it comported with decisions in jurisdictions having
statutes that distinguish the work of designers and construction laborers from that of materialmen and manufacturers. 5
However, to the extent that the analysis found separate liability for selling the glass, it created a weak spot in statutory construction. This weak spot has been magnified by the Pfeifer
decision.
The Pfeifer court examined the Washington statute and
found that the activity of selling was absent from the list of
activities mentioned.7 6 Consequently, the court determined
that it was possible that the legislature did not intend selling to
be protected.7 7 The court chose to construe the statute strictly,
based on the rule of statutory construction that statutes should
not be construed to supplant the common law "[a]bsent an
indication that the legislature intends [it to.]"7 8 The court
found § 353 to be part of the common law of Washington,
although to do so, it admitted it was using the term common
law "in its broader sense."79 Having determined that § 353 is
Washington common law, the court scrutinized the statute of
repose and asserted that it contained no legislative intent to
supplant § 353. °
Section 353 is a Restatement theory that addresses liability
arising from the transfer of possessory interests in land. It is
not specific to construction and it mirrors a companion theory
for the liability of landlords to lessees.8 ' Section 353 imposes a
duty of care on vendors-a duty nonexistent at common law.
In addition, § 353's historical genesis is a response to real property rights, not the law of sales.
While the Pfeifer court determined that the act of selling
was not protected by the statute of repose because of the
74. Id.
75. See Note, supra note 30, at 264-65 nn.23-28.
76. Pfeifer, 112 Wash. 2d at 569, 771 P.2d at 1022.
77. Id. at 570, 772 P.2d at 1022.
78. Id. at 566, 772 P.2d at 1020 (citing 2A J.
CONSTRUCTION § 50.01, at 422 (4th ed. 1984)).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 358 (1965).

SUTHERLAND,

STATUTORY
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absence of the activity of selling, listed in the numerous activities in the statute, one could as easily argue that its absence
from the list was an oversight. It is more consistent with the
policy of the statute of repose that the legislature would have
stated so explicitly had it intended to exclude § 353 actions
against builders from the protection of the statute.
The statute of repose is likely silent about the activity of
selling because the legislature did not believe that selling the
improvement is an activity that is severable and distinct from
the activity of its construction. The different types of financial
return that those in the construction industry receive for their
work are not discussed in Washington's statute nor in any of
the statutes of repose nationwide.
The sale of a product or a service is the culminating act of
any commercial endeavor. However, the aspect of sale
involved in such endeavors is largely ignored in delineations of
the rights and obligations involved in the endeavors themselves. In defense of the Howell court, the activity of sale is
traditionally linked to the activity of manufacture. The statutory language that encouraged the line of analysis applied in
Howell to distinguish between construction and manufacturing
activities would induce the legal mind to categorize each act
alleged. Because the plaintiff in Howell alleged liability for
manufacture and sale of the glass, the court ascribed liability
to each act. The Howell court did not, however, identify any
particular aspect of the sale that might result in liability.
The Pfeifer court's application of Howell's "activity analysis" distorted this categorizing perspective by distinguishing
the activity of selling from the totality of the construction process. This distortion is contrary to the purpose of a statute that
grants builders a cloak of protection for their work. Because
the statute bars "any cause of action," it bars a builder's intentional acts as well as his negligent acts. The builder remains
liable for all of his actions for six years. The legislature thus
decreed that six years is an adequate time for the new owner
of the property to discover any defects. The intent of the legislature is to start the clock running when the improvement is
substantially completed. 2 Whether the new owner hires a
82. JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, Report of Standing Committee, at 994-95 (1967). In
point of inquiry, Senator Uhlman explained the striking of the word "earlier" and its
replacement with "later" to reflect the intent that the statute begin to roll for those
involved with the construction of the improvement only after its substantial
completion.
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contractor to make an improvement, or whether he buys the
improvement from a contractor, the legal result should be the
same.
The Pfeifer decision finds a lack of statutory intent to supplant § 353. In so doing, the court failed to consider that the
legislature had no reason to contemplate the Restatement theory when it framed the statute. Thus, Justice Durham, in her
dissent, correctly stated that the holding is contrary to "plain
sense." 3 The practical result of the court's holding is to transfer the latent liability of the construction activity to the act of
selling. It makes no sense for the court to acquiesce to the legislature's determination that six years is a reasonable length of
time to discover construction defects, including those intentionally created, and then to determine that the act of selling
the property can alter this length of time.
B. The § 353 Broadsword
The Pfeifer court justified its analysis by suggesting that it
would be unfair to protect a vendor of real property from an
action for concealment merely because he had built the
improvement." Although at first glance this reasoning seems
appealing, it raises an equally valid counter-argument that the
fairness of the statute should not depend on the builder's
involvement in the financing of the improvement.
1. Fairness Can Cut Either Way
The holding in Pfeifer that § 353 actions will not be barred
by Wash. Rev. Code §§ 4.16.300-.320 leaves the builder/vendor
exposed to liability for negligent construction based solely on
his posture in the financing of the improvement. The holding
is based on considerations of fairness, but this fairness is
directed to the pool of potential plaintiffs who raise § 353 complaints. The holding creates and leaves unresolved unfairness
more likely to occur to other potential plaintiffs under the
statute of repose. Although the thrust of the Pfeifer holding
reflects the court's failure to recognize the unfairness to potential defendants, the court also missed an obvious class of plaintiffs. This anomaly can be illustrated in the following
hypothetical situation:
83. Pfeifer, 112 Wash. 2d at 571, 772 P.2d at 1023 (Durham, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 568, 722 P.2d at 1022.
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Bob Builder acquires Blackacre, an undeveloped tract section. He sells lots to Carl, Dave, and Ethel, retaining unsold
lots for himself. Carl, Dave, and Ethel arrange financing and
hire Bob to build houses for them on their lots. Bob builds
"spec houses" on the lots remaining unsold. All the houses are
substantially identical. Bob then sells the spec houses to Fred,
Gary, and Helen. Seven years pass, and damage occurs allegedly because of poor construction that Bob failed to mention.
Carl, Dave, and Ethel cannot sue Bob as a builder under § 353
and are barred from doing so under a negligence theory by the
statute of repose. However, Fred, Gary, and Helen can sue him
as a vendor, even though he is equally culpable or innocent in
relation to all of the parties.
By taking the hypothetical further, more problems arise.
As it happens, Carl bought his land on a contract from Bob.
When Carl fell behind in payment, Bob repossessed. Bob subsequently sold the house to Ignacio. Seven years later, Ignacio
can sue Bob. Can Jack, who bought Gary's contract from Bob
and dispossessed Gary, sue Bob?
Although the law of sales can be applied to solve the riddle of who owes whom and for what, the hypotheticals illustrate how quickly the focus of argument can drift away from
the simple rubric of the statute of repose when the liability of
the builder is determined by his status as a vendor of the
improvement.
This illustration merely raises an argument counter to the
Pfeifer court's interpretation of fairness, but the arguments
are not in equipoise. While the court's analysis creates a wider
pool of potential defendants, the pool of plaintiffs profiting
therefrom is based upon the serendipitous timing of the
improvement's transfer. On the other hand, if the statute of
repose controls, no sub-group of plaintiffs gains an advantage
to sue in causes of action based on the construction of the
improvement.
2.

The Strings of Negligence Trailing From § 353.

The court justified its holding by stating that the proof
required under a § 353 action is greater than that required for
a negligence action. In many factual scenarios, however,
including that involved in Pfeifer, this is not the case. The
first element of the Restatement theory depends upon facts
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known to the vendor but not to the vendee.a5 The vendor need
not have actual knowledge of the dangerous condition, but
only a "reason to know" of the condition from other facts
known to him.
Reason to know, as explained in § 12 of the Restatement,
means that "the actor has information from which a person of
reasonable intelligence or of the superior intelligence of the
actor would infer that the fact in question [i.e. the danger]
exists.... 86
The only distinction between this standard and the reasonable person standard in a negligence analysis is the need to
determine if the actor as a reasonable person actually took the
inductive step from "should have known" to "would have
known." While imposition of liability for negligence requires
imputation of a reasonable standard of behavior, imposition of
liability for this element of § 353 requires only imputation of a
reasonable standard of awareness. Liability under § 353 does
not require greater proof, it simply requires an extra inferential step.
The second element of § 353 is purely a negligence standard-a determination whether the vendor realized or should
have realized the risk."7 This element seems to be the major
point at issue in the Pfeifer case. If Island Construction did
not realize the risk, but should have, it will be liable under
§ 353. The proof required to find liability in Pfeifer, therefore,
is the proof required for negligence.
Finally, § 353 imposes liability only until the vendee has
had a reasonable time to discover the condition.s A reasonable time standard is a negligence standard requiring no
greater proof than any other. The policy that allows these negligence standards to trail for an extended length of time from
the transfer of the land conflicts with the policy that cuts off
liability for building upon the land after six years have passed.
That liability depends upon an imputation of knowledge to the
actor does not resolve the conflict.
In contrast to § 353, the statute of repose does not contemplate the builder's state of mind at all. It makes no difference
whether intent or carelessness is involved. The statute oper85.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

86. Id. § 12.
87. Id. § 353 (1)(b).
88. Id. § 353 (2).

§ 353(i)(b) (1965).
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ates to bar "all claims or causes of action of any kind ....
The battle facing a possibly negligent builder/vendor in a § 353
action is thrown into stark relief when one considers that an
electrical subcontractor who knowingly installs substandard
wiring with a seven-year failure time is immune from suit
under the statute of repose. The liberal protection of the statute of repose for defendants stands in complete opposition to
the liberal posture for plaintiffs of § 353.
IV.

LEGAL UNCERTAINTIES IN THE WAKE OF PFEIFER

A. Standardof Proof
The Pfeifer court claimed that its holding harmonized
with the policy behind the statute of repose of protecting builders from damage caused by the actions of others." However,
the court ignored the statute's sister policy of protecting builders against stale claims because allegations are difficult to
defend. By failing to address the affect of its holding on this
latter policy, the court did not have to address the dilemma of
a builder/vendor when defending a § 353 suit brought years
after he has completed his work. In 1984, a New York court
refused to allow a plaintiff to amend his complaint to allege
scienter in order to escape the bar of a statute of limitations
for breach of contract when a negligently built brick wall-facing started to pull away from a building.9' The Pfeifer decision
holds contra.
A central issue in Pfeifer is whether the building was two
or three stories.9 2 The building code does not require a twostory building to have an additional fire exit or additional firestops or firewalls.9 3 If plaintiff prevails in her argument that
the building was three stories, she must further prove that the
defendants should have realized that the building was dangerous, that she had no reason to know it was dangerous, that the
builder knew or had reason to know that she would not discover the danger, and that she did not have a reasonable
opportunity to discover the danger in order to prevail in her
§ 353 claim.
Without denying any fact alleged, the builder can still con89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See aupra note 2.
Pfeifer v. Bellingbam, 112 Wash. 2d 562, 568, 772 P.2d 1018, 1022 (1989).
Lewis v. Axinn, 473 N.Y.S.2d 575, 100 A.D.2d 617 (1984).
Pfeifer, 112 Wash. 2d at 564, 772 P.2d at 10i9.
Id.
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tend that he built the structure in good faith and did not
actively misrepresent its condition. Clearly, reasonable minds
can disagree whether failure to inform the vendee that the
building had only one fire exit and fewer structural safety features than a three-story building comprised culpable concealment of dangerous condition.
In other cases of failure to disclose arising out of negligent
construction, the outcome of a trial on the merits can be as
uncertain. Because § 353 imposes liability on an actor who
does not actually know of the danger but, because of his position and level of skill, has reason to know, it retains a negligence standard of behavior. For instance, does a do-it-yourself
homeowner have a duty to tell his buyer that the wiring in his
house was not done by a professional?"
The distinction that the Pfeifer court sees between hazardous construction and a failure to disclose a dangerous condition
becomes less clear as time passes. Because negligence is predicated on what the actor knew or should have known, it
becomes difficult to unravel whether the actor had or did not
have reason to know of the likelihood of danger at the point of
sale. Courts, therefore, must be particularly careful in their
analysis to distinguish between the culpability of the builder
for what he should have known and for what he failed to disclose because he had reason to know. This analysis may not be
difficult if the facts establish a knowing disregard for the
incorporation of safety features into the improvement. But in
cases where the gravamen of the action is negligence, as in the
principal case, proof of negligence easily translates into a duty
to disclose.
Although Island Construction altered the architect's preapproved plans, the altered plans were subsequently submitted
to the Bellingham Building Department and approved, and the
city inspected the work and accepted it. 95 Co-defendant City of
94. See, e.g., Smith v. Showalter, 47 Wash. App. 245, 734 P.2d 928 (1987). In this
case, plaintiff's house was damaged by faulty wiring installed by the previous
homeowner/vendor. The court avoided the bar of WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.16.300-.320 by
interpretating "substantial completion" strictly. If the claim had been barred by the
statute of repose, under Pfeifer, the plaintiff would have been allowed to recast the
negligence claim as a § 353 claim for failure to disclose.
The Pfeifer court did not address the issue of vendor liability when it cited Smith:
it dismissed the issue by stating only that the plaintiffs did not allege a claim against
the defendants as sellers. Pfeifer, 112 Wash. 2d at 569, 772 P.2d at 1022.
95. Brief for Cross-Appellants Massey, et al in response to WSTLA's amicus
curiae brief at 11, Id., 112 Wash. 2d 562, 112 P.2d 1018.
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Bellingham asserted that Island Construction purposely
altered building plans after they had been pre-approved so that
the new plans would receive only cursory inspection. 96 It is
equally possible, however, that Island Construction merely
altered the plans in response to circumstances at the job site.
Construction began in 1978' and the Willowwood Condominiums were completed by 1979.98 The case is currently in
litigation twelve years later.99 The facts of the case suggest
that the lack of an alternate fire exit was a patent defect that a
vendor would have no duty to disclose. The lack of fire stops
and two-hour fire walls would be latent defects because the
plaintiff can assert that she had no knowledge that two-story
buildings did not require them. By holding that the plaintiff
had stated a cause of action under § 353, the court implies that
a vendor has a duty to disclose the danger of a single fire exit
or the lack of latent fire protection features. If the court bases
liability on the existence of only a single fire exit, then the
trier of fact must find that Island Construction not only realized the risk, but realized that the plaintiff would not discover
it herself. The Pfeifer decision provides no guidance whether
proof of knowing concealment requires direct or merely inferential evidence. Regardless of the majority's assertion that the
proof required under § 353 is higher than that for negligence,
the level of proof it now requires to allege the duty to disclose
a dangerous condition is in fact negligence.
B. PartiesAffected
The Pfeifer decision does not specify which defendants are
now potentially subject to liability under a fraudulent concealment theory. If the court refuses to entertain other creative
theories, only builder/vendors will be affected directly. General contractors seeking indemnity from negligent subcontractors would be barred by the statute. Other parties to the
improvement without transferable property rights would be
protected as well. However, in Howell v. Burk, the New Mexico court permitted liability predicated on the sale of glass, not
96. Brief for Respondent City of Bellingham at 13-14, 1&
97. Brief for Appellant Pfeifer at 3, Id.
98. 112 Wash. 2d at 564, 772 P.2d at 1019.
99. Interview with Allan H. Baris, Counsel for Respondents Island Construction,
et al, in Seattle (Sept. 27, 1989).
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on the transfer of land. Thus, because the Pfeifer Court
adopted Howell, it did not limit its "activity analysis" to § 353.
Section 353 deals with concealment during transfers of
real property. There may be other theories, however, that can
be applied in situations that do not involve vendors. As an
example, section 557A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
which deals with liability for fraudulent misrepresentations
causing physical harm states as follows:
One who by a fraudulent misrepresentation or nondisclosure of a fact that it is his duty to disclose causes physical
harm to the person or to the land of chattel or another who
justifiably relies upon° the misrepresentation, is subject to
liability to the other.'0
Under this theory, it is possible that subcontractors could
be liable for failure to reveal their negligence to their general
contractors. Too, receipt of payment under false pretenses is
not an activity listed in the statute of repose. This would allow
indemnity actions by contractors who are sued in the wake of
Pfeifer. It would also allow actions against contractors who
fail to reveal negligent repair, renovation, and remodeling
work done for owners who already control the property. The
complaint is easy to allege. It is proper for a property owner
to rely on the representations of a contractor, because the contractor knows how to do his job. If he is in fact negligent in his
work, his defense must be that he is too poor a workman to
realize it, because if he is not, then he is liable for failure to
disclose his mistakes. Pfeifer invites this type of creative
pleading.
V.

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE COURT AND THE LEGISLATURE

Pfeifer v. Bellingham should be reconsidered. Because a
§ 353 cause of action is so easily alleged, the court must set out
criteria for determining when the condition created by the
builder/vendor has breached the threshold of unwitting negligence to the level of knowing failure to disclose. The § 353
standard for scienter blends too smoothly into negligence to be
easily distinguished from the areas that are intended to be protected by the statute of repose.
The threshold necessary to survive a motion to dismiss
should be higher--a finding that reasonable minds must agree
100.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF TORTS,

§ 557A (1976).
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that the proof offered demonstrates that the actor was aware
of the danger. This standard requires more than mere proof
that he simply did the work. Such a showing should demonstrate some positive action to conceal the condition rather than
the ambiguous § 353 standard of failure to disclose. The Pfeifer court's own assertion that § 353 requires greater proof than
does negligence echoes the argument that the burden of persuasion should be high. However, it is likely that the development of this burden in subsequent cases may result in further
confusion simply because of the ambiguity of the facts of

Pfeifer.
In an attempt to provide a remedy for damage caused by
fraudulent construction, the Washington State Trial Lawyers
Association, in an amicus brief, urged the court to carve out an
exception for fraud. 10 1 The court unanimously declined to do
so, the dissent stating that such an exception would be a job for
the legislature, not the court. 10 2 Such an exception would
undermine the policies of the statute of repose. Any exception
contemplated certainly should not depend on the builder's posture as the vendor of the improvement.
A clearer solution is possible. A § 353 vendor is under no
duty to inspect for dangerous conditions.0 3 Further, § 353 liability runs only until the vendee has had reasonable time to
discover the defect himself. 1' 4 The drafters of the Restatement
considered the question of a reasonable length of time for this
discovery found it to be an unsettled issue. 1 5 Courts considering this time period, however, have, on an ad hoc basis, arrived
at a variety of different interpretations of the phrase "a reasonable length of time."'1 6
This time limit should not extend past a statutory cut-off
based on the premise that most if not all defects can be discovered in that period of time. An open-ended time limit for § 353
actions is in direct conflict with a statute having the purpose of
barring all causes of action, negligence and fraud alike, that
arise out of the creation of the dangerous condition.
The Pfeifer court left itself and the legislature a loophole
to escape the potential morass of future suits. In its dismissal
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Pfe~fer, 112 Wash. 2d at 570-71, 772 P.2d at 1023.
Id. at 574, 772 P.2d at 1025 (Durham, J. dissenting).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 353, comment b (1965).
See supra note 33, § 353(2).
TENT. DRAFT No. 5, supra note 44.
See supra note 33, § 353 at 121.
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of the parties' constitutional arguments, the court suggested
that the legislature might have a rational basis to distinguish
between "sellers who improve property and those who do
not."'' °7 However, without any findings in the record, the court
chose to assume that "it is equally rational to impose the duties
of a seller on those builders who also sell their property."'"
The court's adoption of the former statement leaves a
clear path for a legislative reworking of the statute to make its
intent more clear. The statute has received minor amendments in the past. 1°9 Moreover, it would be easy to add after
the phrase ". . . six years after the substantial completion of
construction,""' the phrase "or its transfer by the builder, by
sale or otherwise." Such an addition would indicate that the
sale of the improvement is not meant to be distinguished from
the activities more clearly protected by the statute, such as
those related to making improvements to real property.
A better solution would be to place a six year limitation of
repose on claims brought under a § 353 theory. Although this
solution might not completely satisfy the policy of encouraging
new construction, the policy still remains. Moreover, the solution also furthers the rationale for protecting against stale
claims. Should this suggestion be considered too broad, the
court could simply hold that the legislature's determination
that six years is a reasonable length of time to discover construction defects applies equally to defects alleged under § 353
theories.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The holding in Pfeifer not only destroys the cloak of the
statute of repose for builders who subsequently sell an
improvement, but may open the door to claims against others
who make improvements to real property as well. The
supreme court must make clear guidelines for acceptable levels
of proof required to carry forward a claim against a builder/
vendor. Even better, the court should heed statutory intent
and apply the six-year time limit in the statute of repose to
transfers of interest in land. Alternately, the legislature
107.
108.
109.
exclude
1363 (to
110.

Pfeifer, 112 Wash. 2d at 570, 772 P.2d at 1023.
Id.
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.300, as amended by 1986 Wash. Laws 1363-64, (to
manufacturers); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.310, as amended by 1986 Wash. Laws
include actions brought in the name of the state).
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.310.
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should reword the statute to point out clearly whether the
court's interpretation in Pfeifer is incorrect. The legislature
could add an exception for intentional construction of dangerous improvements, but it makes no sense for this exception to
depend solely on the financial posture of the builder in relation to the improvement.
PeterSandomire

